Our world shuddered with horror when one of the four Bihar policemen kidnapped by Maoists was murdered in cold blood. Three were released unharmed – and we rejoiced. But is this the end of this cruelest of political games?
Of course not. Within days of the Bihar release, three insurance agents were kidnapped somewhere near Kolkata by suspected Maoists. Why insurance agents? The question is really irrelevant because any human beings will do for militants around the world. They may be policemen, civil servants, children, women, journalists or air/train passengers. Human lives are the best bargaining chips.
Lalu’s Bihar might have taken kidnapping to the level of an everyday business. But whether it is a doctor kidnapped for ransom, or a busload of passengers hijacked by an aggrieved policeman as in Manila, there is a unique fear factor in this business. When Mumbai-based American journalist Daniel Pearl was captured by terrorists in Pakistan, video footage released by the captors, masked men holding guns to the kneeling victim’s head, terrorised the whole world. Then that innocent young man was beheaded. The extraordinary cruelty involved in many kidnappings makes this perhaps the most vexatious problem of our times.
That could also explain why most politically motivated kidnappings are successful. The Iran hostage crisis lasted 444 days following the seizure of the US embassy in Teheran by militants. It lasted that long because neither side wanted a bloodbath. The Americans staged a military rescue operation, but it failed. Eventually diplomatic negotiations by third parties led to the release of all American hostages.
The Tupamaros guerilla movement in Latin America succeeded in ending the myth of American invincibility. Their most dramatic operation was the kidnapping of the US ambassador near his home in Rio de Janeiro in 1969. In two weeks the Brazilian Government capitulated and agreed to release 15 Leftist prisoners. In 1970 the German Ambassador in Guatemala was kidnapped. But the Government refused to free prisoners in exchange and the hapless ambassador was killed.
The Indian Airlines hijack saw the most abject of surrenders. One passenger was killed and many wounded. Even then Delhi not only released the prisoners named by the terrorists, but Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh personally accompanied them to Kandahar. The need for that special tribute to terrorism still remains unexplained.
By contrast, Veerappan was rather decent the way he treated the captured Rajkumar in 2000. The Kannada hero was held captive for 108 days. The desperate Karnataka Government was willing to release the prisoners Veerappan mentioned, but the courts barred any release. In the end money changed hands, though nobody admitted it. But the point was that Rajkumar was safe and sound – and rather more philosophical about life, as was evident from the grace and dignity with which he met the press upon release.
Kidnapping ordinary people is an easy crime to commit. Hence its appeal to those who operate beyond the lines of legitimacy. Religious terrorists do it for a doomed cause. Political terrorists may cite a more plausible cause such as fighting for the rights of the poor and exploited. But all are terrorists and all are taking advantage of the helplessness of the unprotected.
We don’t know what bargains were struck to save at least three lives in Bihar. But we know that more kidnappings, more cowardly acts like train derailment, will take place as long as the problem of basic deprivations of people is not addressed. The more is the pit
Sunday, September 12, 2010
Monday, September 6, 2010
yes, we have options, do we have the will?
Another war with India is unlikely to be on China's agenda. But menacing military build-up and other needling tactics to divert India's energies and attention is central to its agenda. It’s an old ploy. But the level of aggressiveness is new.
India's politicians, the TV channels in particular, have a way of reacting to such unfriendly actions in an emotional, high-decibel style. Which is reminiscent of the Nehru-era cries like “we won't let them get one inch of Indian territory”. If anything, such declamatory posturings only reduce our own ability to work out counter-strategies in a cool and calculating manner.
Actually, we should learn from the Chinese how to be calculating. With a hundred-year perspective, they planned the strategic encirclement of India, with bases in Burma, Sri Lanka and Pakistan – even as we steadily lost our influence in neighbouring countries. With the same long-term view of history, they built up their road and rail networks in the Tibetan territory previously considered inhospitable to such transportation facilities. Recently they successfully tested their strategic airlift capability, an area where they have advanced very far with 450 high-capacity military cargo planes.
India is famous for dithering when it comes to military acquisition. Unseen middlemen still controlling the bulk of the transactions is only half the problem. The other half is our insistence of all kinds of special provisions, from incorporating systems still on the drawing board to establishing joint venture facilities. The result is that in all three wings of the defence forces, our strike capacity is well below the required level.
Sure, we have deployed significant troop numbers along the northern border and mountain road networks are being expanded. There will be no repeat of 1962. But it will take a heavy dose of unilateral patriotism to claim that India is a match to China in the military field.
The Chinese have been very smart in their diplomatic tantrums as well. Look at the calculations that must have gone into the stapled-visa system they invented for residents of Jammu & Kashmir. By introducing that system, China did not deny the validity of Indian passports held by Kashmiris, nor did it debar Kashmiris from travelling to China because of their Indian passports. It merely established that it did not recognise J & K being a part of India either in theory or in practice.
Smartly, again, it made no such distinction vis a vis residents of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir; they continue to have their visa stamped on their passports. By doing so, China established its recognition of the PoK areas as a legitimate part of Pakistan. A cleverly nuanced dual policy that hit India on the head and patted Pakistan on the shoulder.
Pakistan has been no less smart. By pretending to fight the Taliban, it has won the backing of the Americans. It has won also all-inclusive support from the Chinese by giving the Chinese three vital services they need: Keeping India pinned down, providing access routes to Iran and suppressing the Muslim nationalists in Xinjiang. While it encourages and finances Islamist groups, it suppresses the Uighur Islamists who are fighting the Chinese. It gets full help from China and the US at the same time.
India is demonstrably friendless because (a) we do not have a bold enough political leadership and (b) we are too obsessed with the US. We should be having a stridently active programme in east and Southeast Asia. From Japan and South Korea to Indonesia, all the countries of the region have been angered by China’s claim that all of the South China Sea is its territorial waters. This is a theatre where India would be warmly welcomed.
The first thing to do is to have a military-strategic action plan with Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia. As China’s economic power grows, its ambitions to dominate the world are also growing. This is the explanation for its newfound haughtiness. India has options in such a context – if it has the will to use them.
India's politicians, the TV channels in particular, have a way of reacting to such unfriendly actions in an emotional, high-decibel style. Which is reminiscent of the Nehru-era cries like “we won't let them get one inch of Indian territory”. If anything, such declamatory posturings only reduce our own ability to work out counter-strategies in a cool and calculating manner.
Actually, we should learn from the Chinese how to be calculating. With a hundred-year perspective, they planned the strategic encirclement of India, with bases in Burma, Sri Lanka and Pakistan – even as we steadily lost our influence in neighbouring countries. With the same long-term view of history, they built up their road and rail networks in the Tibetan territory previously considered inhospitable to such transportation facilities. Recently they successfully tested their strategic airlift capability, an area where they have advanced very far with 450 high-capacity military cargo planes.
India is famous for dithering when it comes to military acquisition. Unseen middlemen still controlling the bulk of the transactions is only half the problem. The other half is our insistence of all kinds of special provisions, from incorporating systems still on the drawing board to establishing joint venture facilities. The result is that in all three wings of the defence forces, our strike capacity is well below the required level.
Sure, we have deployed significant troop numbers along the northern border and mountain road networks are being expanded. There will be no repeat of 1962. But it will take a heavy dose of unilateral patriotism to claim that India is a match to China in the military field.
The Chinese have been very smart in their diplomatic tantrums as well. Look at the calculations that must have gone into the stapled-visa system they invented for residents of Jammu & Kashmir. By introducing that system, China did not deny the validity of Indian passports held by Kashmiris, nor did it debar Kashmiris from travelling to China because of their Indian passports. It merely established that it did not recognise J & K being a part of India either in theory or in practice.
Smartly, again, it made no such distinction vis a vis residents of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir; they continue to have their visa stamped on their passports. By doing so, China established its recognition of the PoK areas as a legitimate part of Pakistan. A cleverly nuanced dual policy that hit India on the head and patted Pakistan on the shoulder.
Pakistan has been no less smart. By pretending to fight the Taliban, it has won the backing of the Americans. It has won also all-inclusive support from the Chinese by giving the Chinese three vital services they need: Keeping India pinned down, providing access routes to Iran and suppressing the Muslim nationalists in Xinjiang. While it encourages and finances Islamist groups, it suppresses the Uighur Islamists who are fighting the Chinese. It gets full help from China and the US at the same time.
India is demonstrably friendless because (a) we do not have a bold enough political leadership and (b) we are too obsessed with the US. We should be having a stridently active programme in east and Southeast Asia. From Japan and South Korea to Indonesia, all the countries of the region have been angered by China’s claim that all of the South China Sea is its territorial waters. This is a theatre where India would be warmly welcomed.
The first thing to do is to have a military-strategic action plan with Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia. As China’s economic power grows, its ambitions to dominate the world are also growing. This is the explanation for its newfound haughtiness. India has options in such a context – if it has the will to use them.
yes, we have options, do we have the will?
Another war with India is unlikely to be on China's agenda. But menacing military build-up and other needling tactics to divert India's energies and attention is central to its agenda. It’s an old ploy. But the level of aggressiveness is new.
India's politicians, the TV channels in particular, have a way of reacting to such unfriendly actions in an emotional, high-decibel style. Which is reminiscent of the Nehru-era cries like “we won't let them get one inch of Indian territory”. If anything, such declamatory posturings only reduce our own ability to work out counter-strategies in a cool and calculating manner.
Actually, we should learn from the Chinese how to be calculating. With a hundred-year perspective, they planned the strategic encirclement of India, with bases in Burma, Sri Lanka and Pakistan – even as we steadily lost our influence in neighbouring countries. With the same long-term view of history, they built up their road and rail networks in the Tibetan territory previously considered inhospitable to such transportation facilities. Recently they successfully tested their strategic airlift capability, an area where they have advanced very far with 450 high-capacity military cargo planes.
India is famous for dithering when it comes to military acquisition. Unseen middlemen still controlling the bulk of the transactions is only half the problem. The other half is our insistence of all kinds of special provisions, from incorporating systems still on the drawing board to establishing joint venture facilities. The result is that in all three wings of the defence forces, our strike capacity is well below the required level.
Sure, we have deployed significant troop numbers along the northern border and mountain road networks are being expanded. There will be no repeat of 1962. But it will take a heavy dose of unilateral patriotism to claim that India is a match to China in the military field.
The Chinese have been very smart in their diplomatic tantrums as well. Look at the calculations that must have gone into the stapled-visa system they invented for residents of Jammu & Kashmir. By introducing that system, China did not deny the validity of Indian passports held by Kashmiris, nor did it debar Kashmiris from travelling to China because of their Indian passports. It merely established that it did not recognise J & K being a part of India either in theory or in practice.
Smartly, again, it made no such distinction vis a vis residents of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir; they continue to have their visa stamped on their passports. By doing so, China established its recognition of the PoK areas as a legitimate part of Pakistan. A cleverly nuanced dual policy that hit India on the head and patted Pakistan on the shoulder.
Pakistan has been no less smart. By pretending to fight the Taliban, it has won the backing of the Americans. It has won also all-inclusive support from the Chinese by giving the Chinese three vital services they need: Keeping India pinned down, providing access routes to Iran and suppressing the Muslim nationalists in Xinjiang. While it encourages and finances Islamist groups, it suppresses the Uighur Islamists who are fighting the Chinese. It gets full help from China and the US at the same time.
India is demonstrably friendless because (a) we do not have a bold enough political leadership and (b) we are too obsessed with the US. We should be having a stridently active programme in east and Southeast Asia. From Japan and South Korea to Indonesia, all the countries of the region have been angered by China’s claim that all of the South China Sea is its territorial waters. This is a theatre where India would be warmly welcomed.
The first thing to do is to have a military-strategic action plan with Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia. As China’s economic power grows, its ambitions to dominate the world are also growing. This is the explanation for its newfound haughtiness. India has options in such a context – if it has the will to use them.
India's politicians, the TV channels in particular, have a way of reacting to such unfriendly actions in an emotional, high-decibel style. Which is reminiscent of the Nehru-era cries like “we won't let them get one inch of Indian territory”. If anything, such declamatory posturings only reduce our own ability to work out counter-strategies in a cool and calculating manner.
Actually, we should learn from the Chinese how to be calculating. With a hundred-year perspective, they planned the strategic encirclement of India, with bases in Burma, Sri Lanka and Pakistan – even as we steadily lost our influence in neighbouring countries. With the same long-term view of history, they built up their road and rail networks in the Tibetan territory previously considered inhospitable to such transportation facilities. Recently they successfully tested their strategic airlift capability, an area where they have advanced very far with 450 high-capacity military cargo planes.
India is famous for dithering when it comes to military acquisition. Unseen middlemen still controlling the bulk of the transactions is only half the problem. The other half is our insistence of all kinds of special provisions, from incorporating systems still on the drawing board to establishing joint venture facilities. The result is that in all three wings of the defence forces, our strike capacity is well below the required level.
Sure, we have deployed significant troop numbers along the northern border and mountain road networks are being expanded. There will be no repeat of 1962. But it will take a heavy dose of unilateral patriotism to claim that India is a match to China in the military field.
The Chinese have been very smart in their diplomatic tantrums as well. Look at the calculations that must have gone into the stapled-visa system they invented for residents of Jammu & Kashmir. By introducing that system, China did not deny the validity of Indian passports held by Kashmiris, nor did it debar Kashmiris from travelling to China because of their Indian passports. It merely established that it did not recognise J & K being a part of India either in theory or in practice.
Smartly, again, it made no such distinction vis a vis residents of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir; they continue to have their visa stamped on their passports. By doing so, China established its recognition of the PoK areas as a legitimate part of Pakistan. A cleverly nuanced dual policy that hit India on the head and patted Pakistan on the shoulder.
Pakistan has been no less smart. By pretending to fight the Taliban, it has won the backing of the Americans. It has won also all-inclusive support from the Chinese by giving the Chinese three vital services they need: Keeping India pinned down, providing access routes to Iran and suppressing the Muslim nationalists in Xinjiang. While it encourages and finances Islamist groups, it suppresses the Uighur Islamists who are fighting the Chinese. It gets full help from China and the US at the same time.
India is demonstrably friendless because (a) we do not have a bold enough political leadership and (b) we are too obsessed with the US. We should be having a stridently active programme in east and Southeast Asia. From Japan and South Korea to Indonesia, all the countries of the region have been angered by China’s claim that all of the South China Sea is its territorial waters. This is a theatre where India would be warmly welcomed.
The first thing to do is to have a military-strategic action plan with Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia. As China’s economic power grows, its ambitions to dominate the world are also growing. This is the explanation for its newfound haughtiness. India has options in such a context – if it has the will to use them.
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